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INTRODUCTION
I strongly believe that we need a very stringent standard of proof
in criminal cases. I do not think, however, that Daubert v. Merrell Dow
1
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. has been productive in effectuating this goal. In
civil cases, courts engage in rigorous gatekeeping and often exclude
plaintiffs’ experts because the theory underlying their testimony has
not been adequately validated. But I see no sign of a parallel
approach in criminal cases even when there are problems with the
2
assumptions on which the prosecution’s expert testimony rests. I do
not think, however, that more stringent attention to the reasoning of
Daubert would greatly improve matters. Daubert overemphasizes how
the data underlying the expert’s opinion was produced and distracts
courts and counsel from carefully analyzing what the evidence proves,
and how it is being used. Daubert stresses the medium over the
message.
In criminal cases, Daubert may therefore be
counterproductive by diverting attention from other evidentiary
principles that should be considered in handling expert proof.
I reached these conclusions after looking at expert testimony
dealing with forensic identification, the field that encompasses a
group of markedly different techniques that have in common the
objective of matching a sample associated with the defendant (or
3
victim) to a sample found at the crime scene. I limited myself to
∗

Suzanne J. and Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I wish
to thank David H. Kaye for his helpful comments.
1
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2
For example, see the following cases which refused to exclude the
prosecution’s experts despite extensive defense challenges: United States v. Llera
Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (fingerprints); United States v. Prime, 220
F. Supp. 2d 1203 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (handwriting).
3
To make this easier to read, I will assume throughout this comment that the
samples being matched relate to the defendant though, of course they might relate
to the victim, as, for instance, bloodstains on the defendant’s clothing that match the
victim’s blood. Sometimes, but rarely, a defendant might seek to introduce this kind
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considering some of these techniques for two reasons. First, forensic
identification seemed the category of proof with regard to which it
would be easiest to discern and to evaluate the impact and usefulness
of the Supreme Court’s approach to expert testimony. Whether a
particular forensic technique can in fact match two tangible samples
would seem a question far easier to answer than determining the
reliability of other expert proof that cannot be empirically tested
4
5
because of ethical considerations or lack of knowledge. Second, the
forensic identification category includes DNA profiling which is
6
undoubtedly our “gold standard” of expertise. Understanding why
DNA evidence has this distinction would, I thought, be helpful in
providing a model against which other identification techniques
could be judged.
I. DNA EVIDENCE
A look at how DNA typing works and how it became recognized
7
as the preeminent forensic tool in less than twenty years explains why
the legal and scientific communities have so much confidence in
DNA as an identification technique. DNA evidence’s road to
admissibility differed from that of other forensic identification
techniques. DNA typing is not like the other forensic specialties
which originated within the law enforcement community and whose
sole purpose is to facilitate investigations and prosecutions. Forensic
DNA typing is the by-product of cutting-edge science.
The
underlying theory on which it rests—that no individuals other than
identical twins have identical DNA profiles—had already been
universally ratified by the scientific community before DNA’s forensic
of evidence which may raise constitutional issues that I will not address.
4
Obviously, one cannot set up controlled experiments to determine whether
abused subjects develop various syndromes or repressed memories.
5
Perhaps some day we will have physiological markers for liars and those who
do not know right from wrong that will lead to a very different type of expert
testimony than that provided by psychiatrists battling over an insanity defense, or
seeking to testify to predictions of dangerousness.
6
DNA has been more thoroughly scrutinized than any other field of criminal
investigation. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, THE
FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
WORKING GROUP 7 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice 2000) [hereinafter FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA
TESTING].
7
The first forensic use of DNA testing occurred in England in 1986. See
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, POSTCONVICTION DNA
TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 1 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice 1999)
[hereinafter POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING]. The first United States appellate court
opinion on the admissibility of DNA evidence was issued in 1988 in Andrews v. State,
533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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potential was recognized. And every step of the way, scientists
monitored the use of DNA typing as a means of forensic
identification.
From the beginning, eminent scientists agreed to testify as
9
expert witnesses and to serve on committees looking at forensic
issues, perhaps for fear of what lawyers would do without proper
guidance. The National Academy of Sciences issued a report on
DNA in 1992, only six years after the first known use of DNA testing
10
in a criminal investigation anywhere in the world. A second report
11
followed in 1996 because the field was changing so rapidly. The
scientists’ critiques and criticisms led to numerous improvements in
DNA technology and caused some courts to exclude DNA evidence
12
until the flaws were corrected.
In order to comprehend the evidentiary issues posed by other
forensic identification techniques, it is important to understand what
DNA typing proves and how input from the scientific community
amplified the probative value of a match between the defendant’s
DNA and a crime scene sample. Forensic DNA testing does not
require matching the entire genetic code found in the two samples
from the crime scene and a suspect.
Rather, the examiner
determines whether a tiny percentage of the available DNA sequence
is identical at a number of specific loci or markers shown to be
13
independent and variable. A match therefore means only that the
defendant is a possible source of the crime scene sample. Over time,
two developments in particular enhanced the probative value of a
8

COMMITTEE ON DNA FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN UPDATE, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 9 (Nat’l Academy Press 1996)
(“DNA typing . . . is based on a large body of scientific principles and techniques that
are universally accepted.”) [hereinafter NRC II].
9
In People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 957 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), the court
conducted a Frye hearing over a 12-week period that resulted in a transcript of over
5000 pages; it heard from numerous scientists, including Dr. Eric Lander of the
Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research at MIT, before concluding that
evidence could not be admitted because generally accepted scientific techniques for
obtaining reliable results had not been employed.
10
COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (Nat’l Academy Press 1992).
11
See supra note 8.
12
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW, FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES § 111.2.1 (2002).
13
Three results are possible: (1) a match; (2) a nonmatch that excludes the
defendant as the source of the crime scene sample, but does not necessarily prove
defendant’s innocence; depending on the circumstances he might have committed
the crime without leaving a crime scene sample; and (3) inconclusive results caused
by not enough DNA being available for testing or because the crime scene sample
contained a non-analyzable mixture of DNA from two or more individuals.
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match. Matching became less subjective when laboratories shifted, as
most have done, from the RFLP technology that was originally used
14
to newer methods. Second, far more loci are now used in testing
than originally, thereby making it far less probable that two persons
would match at all. In 1994, testing usually involved looking at three
15
to five DNA sequences. The FBI now uses 13 core STR sequences in
its Combined DNA Index System (Codis) database of convicted
16
offenders.
The strength of the inference that two identical DNA profiles
come from the same individual cannot be determined without
knowing the frequency of defendant’s genetic profile in the general
population. Some courts were reluctant to admit the results of DNA
profiling until the National Academy of Sciences’ 1996 report
17
concluded that the statistics being used were scientifically sound.
Since then scientists have obtained additional frequency data for
numerous population groups and subgroups so that it has now been
calculated that the most common profile has an estimated frequency
18
of less than one in ten billion when the 13 STR loci are used.
Although testifying experts still may dispute the appropriate
probabilities and argue about how they should be expressed, the
number of genetic markers now used in forensic typing means that
the likelihood that two matching profiles came from the same person
or an identical twin approaches certainty, provided that the samples
were properly collected and analyzed.
As soon as DNA was put to forensic use, issues arose about
laboratory performance. Critics had long complained about the sorry
19
state of American crime labs, but this time some changes were
instituted. Quality assurance protocols were designed to maximize
the prospect of
accurate and reliable testing.
In addition,
laboratories adopted stringent quality control protocols that require
them to monitor and document their performance so that they can
14

For a discussion of problems that arose in interpreting results when using
RFLP technology, see David H. Kaye & George F. Sensabaugh, REFERENCE MANUAL
ON DNA EVIDENCE 516-20 (2000).
15
JUDITH A. MCKENNA ET AL., REFERENCE GUIDE ON FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 283 (Fed. Judiciary Ctr. 1994).
16
POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING, supra note 7, at 28; see also FUTURE OF FORENSIC
DNA TESTING, supra note 6, at 19-20.
17
See NRC II, supra note 8, at 52.
18
FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING, supra note 6, at 19.
19
Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for
Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POLICY & L. 439 (1997); see also Paul C.
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Reliability of
Scientific Proof, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1988).
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20

verify compliance with their quality assurance objectives. Periodic
proficiency testing of laboratory personnel is part of this process. Of
course, no human endeavor can be error-free, but by requiring a
laboratory to document extensively everything it does, the protocols
prevent many mistakes and make it easier to detect mishaps that do
occur.
Daubert and DNA match very well. Indeed, it has been suggested
that the advent of DNA profiling may have paved the way for the
21
Supreme Court’s opinion in Daubert.
Criteria which Justice
Blackmun saw as integral to the scientific method—testing, peer
review, publication and standards—all played a role in facilitating the
22
technical advances that placed DNA profiling on such firm ground.
What needs to be remembered, however, is that this evidence is so
powerful because all persons other than identical twins have a unique
genetic pattern and the enormous variability of DNA makes it
possible to distinguish among individuals. It is the nature of nuclear
DNA that gives DNA evidence its enormous probative value. We
should not confuse the process of validation with the inferences that
the evidence permits. Although courts are now so convinced that
DNA evidence is admissible that they generally treat all challenges as
23
going to the weight of the evidence, there may, nevertheless, be
instances when DNA evidence should be found inadmissible or
insufficient to convict, as when fraud has infected a particular
24
laboratory.
Expert proof that satisfies Daubert should not be
immune to other evidentiary challenges.

20
Quality assurance refers to a program conducted by a laboratory to ensure the
accuracy and reliability of the tests it performs. Quality control refers to activities the
laboratory undertakes to monitor, document, and verify laboratory performance. In
other words, a quality control program seeks to demonstrate that the laboratory is
meeting its quality assurance objectives. See Charlotte J. Word, The Future of DNA
Testing and Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 249 (2001).
21
See David L. Faigman, The Tipping Point in the Law’s Use of Science: The Epidemic of
Scientific Sophistication That Began with DNA Profiling and Toxic Torts, 67 BROOK. L. REV.
111 (2001).
22
For a discussion of why no definite error rate has been established or can be
established for DNA testing, see Margaret A. Berger, Laboratory Error Seen Through the
Lens of Science and Policy, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (1997).
23
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 688.
24
Houston’s Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2003, at 20 (DNA testing suspended at Houston Police Department’s crime
laboratory and review ordered of ninety convictions based on DNA testing;
allegations that unit is corrupt or incompetent or both).
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II. MICROSCOPIC HAIR ANALYSIS
Microscopic hair analysis has existed since the turn of the last
century. Until recently forensic examiners regularly relied upon this
technique to identify the defendant through hairs found at the crime
scene. This mode of examination, however, has come under a good
deal of attack since the advent of DNA testing and the decision in
Daubert. It is now known that evidence obtained through microscopic
hair analysis was admitted in a considerable percentage of the cases
in which courts vacated convictions on the basis of postconviction
25
Courts, commentators, and defense counsel have
DNA testing.
questioned whether enough studies were conducted to comply with
26
the dictates of Daubert.
Unlike DNA, which is the same throughout the body’s cells,
hairs taken from the same individual differ from each other. In DNA
analysis, a match means that the examiner has determined that the
DNA being sampled is identical in the two samples being compared.
By contrast, in microscopic hair analysis, there are no true matches.
The technician looks at a collection of hairs taken from the
defendant, which differ from each other, and the hair from the crime
scene. Then, on the basis of a number of microscopic features, the
technician determines whether the questioned hair is or is not
consistent with that of the defendant.
Since Daubert, some research has been conducted with regard to
27
28
this identification technique. We now have the FBI study, which
25
BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 166 (2000) (expert testimony about hair
analysis in cases leading to DNA exonerations). In December 2002, the FBI issued a
report on the hair analysis that had been introduced in the case of a Montana
defendant who was cleared by DNA testing after spending fifteen years in prison for
raping an 8-year-old girl. 2 States to Review Lab Work of Expert Who Erred on ID, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A24. The FBI’s trace evidence unit concluded that the crime
scene samples did not match samples provided by the defendant; although at the
time of the trial, the prosecution’s expert, the director of the Montana Crime
Laboratory, had testified that the chances that either set of hairs found at the scene
were not those of defendant was 1 in 100 and that since head and pubic hairs look
different, “it’s a multiplying effect, it would be 1 chance in 10,000.” Id. In an
interview after the defendant’s exoneration, the expert who has for the past thirteen
years worked as a forensic examiner for the Washington State Police, admitted that
there were no studies that would authorize quantifications of the kind he used, but
that his testimony was based on his experience with hundreds of hair samples. Id.
26
See Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1071 (2003).
27
See Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison
Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 227 (1996) (extensively analyzing and critiquing studies conducted by
Barry Gaudette).
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Richard Friedman discusses at some length in this symposium, in
which FBI examiners compared for accuracy the results of
microscopic DNA analysis with those obtained through
mitochondrial DNA analysis. Friedman states that the likelihood
ratio for this evidence is higher than that for blood type A evidence.
By this he means, if I understand him correctly, that an A type blood
match increases by 2.5 the likelihood that defendant is the
perpetrator while a finding that two hairs come from a common
source increases the odds of defendant being the culprit by 2.89.
Consequently he concludes that microscopic hair analysis evidence
should be admitted unless the witness makes a misleading statement
about what the evidence shows.
Though I too agree that this testimony, flawed as it is, should at
times be admitted, I would approach this problem somewhat
differently. I do not think that likening microscopic hair results to
type A blood tests is an apt comparison. The latter result is not a
statement about accuracy—we assume that lab technicians can
correctly determine that someone has type A blood—but the
likelihood of that characteristic being found in the relevant
population. We have no such scientifically accepted statistics with
regard to microscopic hair examinations; the few studies that purport
to establish the frequency with which hair patterns are distributed are
generally viewed as flawed. That to me is the heart of the problem
with this identification technique. We have some proficiency results
but no way of assessing the probative value of testimony that
defendant’s hair is consistent with hair found at the crime scene.
Now, of course, there is no rule of evidence that states that
evidence of unknown probative value is inadmissible. But we do have
a rule, Rule 403, that states that probative value must be balanced
30
against other specified factors to determine admissibility. It should
not be forgotten that Daubert itself acknowledges the applicability of
Rule 403, and adds a comment of Judge Weinstein’s:
Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading

28

Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial
DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 964 (2002).
29
See Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1047 (2003).
30
FED. RULE EVID. 403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Id.
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because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the
judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force
under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control over
31
experts than over lay witnesses.

How would a Rule 403 approach to microscopic hair evidence
work? Whatever probative value the judge assigns to a microscopic
hair identification should be discounted by the possibility of false
positives, which is probably even higher when specially trained FBI
32
examiners do not make the comparisons. On the other side of the
scale, the judge must assess the extent to which the jury is misled if
the expert expresses an opinion about the probative value of the
microscopic hair analysis. We know from cases and news accounts
that hair examiners often embellish their testimony with probability
estimates based on their personal experience for which there is no
empirical basis.
Then there is unfair prejudice.
The original Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 403 speaks of the risk of “inducing decision
on a purely emotional basis.” I think this condition is fulfilled in a
rape case in which there is no DNA evidence when the prosecution
introduces a hair found on the victim and calls an expert who testifies
that this is a pubic hair which is consistent with the defendant’s. Real
evidence can have a powerful effect. The jury will overestimate the
evidence’s shaky probative value, especially if it is the only evidence
33
that ties the defendant to the scene. We will never know whether it
was microscopic hair analysis testimony—now conceded to have been
inaccurate—that distracted the jury in the Central Park Jogger case
from concerning itself with the vast inconsistencies in the defendants’
34
confessions. Certainly pubic hair testimony is graphic enough to
35
make a jury sit up.
36
Take for instance, a case like State v. Butler, in which defendant
was charged with sodomizing a 16-year-old boy. The perpetrator of
31

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
See supra note 25.
33
See 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1157 (2d ed. 1923) (“[T]here is a
natural tendency to infer from the mere production of any material object, and
without further evidence, the truth of all that is predicated of it.”).
34
See Jim Dwyer & Kevin Flynn, New Light on Jogger’s Rape Calls Evidence into
Question, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, at 1.
35
See JOHN TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 75 (1998), for an account of the Coleman trial, in which the author
reports that the trial judge thought the pubic hair testimony had the greatest affect
on the jury.
36
24 S.W.3d 21 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (en banc), vacated, 2003 WL 41708 (W.D. Mo.
2003) (conviction vacated for ineffective assistance of counsel).
32
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this crime had approached the victim and a 14-year-old at a mobile
home court and asked their help in getting a boat out of storage. He
then took the boys to a secluded area of the mobile park where the
assault took place. Neither boy managed to get a good look at the
assailant. The defendant was arrested 20 months after the attack. His
first trial ended in a mistrial.
At the second trial in 1996, the boys could not identify the
defendant by sight or voice. They gave a general description of a
white assailant of average height and weight that more or less tallied
with defendant’s appearance.
Their estimate of age also
corresponded with that of the defendant. The defendant, who had
no alibi, was a resident of the mobile trailer park and therefore could
have known of the isolated area in which the boys were attacked.
A forensic chemist employed by the state regional crime lab
testified that she was unable to find “any significant differences”
between one head hair found on the 16-year old’s T-shirt and one
pubic hair taken from his underwear and samples collected from the
defendant “that would cause her to exclude defendant as the source
37
of the unidentified hair.” She acknowledged that neither she nor
the forensic community were able to positively identify individuals
38
based on hair comparison. She also testified, however, that both the
samples from the defendant and the crime scene samples “had spots
on the medulla” and that she had done over 1200 examinations
39
without ever previously finding such spots. She also stated that both
the head and pubic hair matched, and believing that two matches
were twice as meaningful, she therefore felt there was a “very strong
probability” that the crime scene hairs came from defendant, and
that that the hairs came from defendant “within a reasonable degree
40
of certainty.” Defendant testified, denied committing the trial, and
offered a rather unlikely story about how his hairs could have been
transferred to the victim in the mobile home park’s swimming pool.
41
Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 107 years.

37

Id. at 47.
Id. at 46.
39
Id. at 32.
40
Id. at 37.
41
On appeal, the defense argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict but
a majority of the court held that since counsel had failed to object to the hair
evidence it had to be considered in ruling on sufficiency, and, therefore, there was
sufficient evidence to convict. Butler, 24 S.W.3d 21. In 2003, a panel of the
intermediate appellate court found that defense counsel’s failure to object to the
hair evidence was not “reasonable trial strategy” and reversed and remanded for
ineffective assistance of counsel. Butler, 2003 WL 41708.
38
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Why I do not simply say, as I think Paul Giannelli might, that
microscopic hair analysis should never be admissible; it is unreliable
because it has not been tested adequately to satisfy Daubert? In the
first place, as the FBI study shows, trained examiners do have some
proficiency in comparing samples accurately, especially when the
evidence is used for purposes of exclusion, a use I discuss below. For
purposes of inclusion, however, the probative value of the testimony
may be substantially outweighed by undue prejudice and/or the
possibility of misleading the jury. The prejudice has to be evaluated
43
in the “evidentiary context” —it may be considerably less than in
Butler if the microscopic hair analysis is offered in a dissimilar kind of
case with a different type of hair and additional evidence to
44
evaluate. But the main reason why I would not adopt a per se rule
excluding microscopic hair analysis testimony is because I cannot
find a principled reason to distinguish this class of evidence from
other forensic identification testimony.
III. MITOCHONDRIAL HAIR ANALYSIS
Why even discuss microscopic hair analysis when mitochondrial
or mtDNA is now available to analyze hair that contains insufficient
45
nuclear DNA to be subjected to nuclear DNA testing? Since 1996, it
has been possible to examine DNA obtained from the mitochondria
of a cell rather than from the nucleus. Unlike nuclear DNA typing
which samples the DNA found at selected loci, mtDNA typing
compares the entire sequence of mitochondrial DNA found in the
46
samples being compared. Like nuclear DNA typing, MtDNA was
initially developed for non-forensic uses and has been tested and peer
reviewed. Laboratories have adopted protocols and standards to
ensure that contamination does not occur, and examiners are
47
required to undergo proficiency tests. The FBI maintains a database
against which it checks the MtDNA sequence in the case under

42

See Giannelli, supra note 26, at 1075-76 (though he does not quite say so).
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 (1977) (suggesting that rather
than viewing an item of evidence “as an island,” when undertaking Rule 403
balancing a judge should “take account of the full evidentiary context of the case as
the court understands it when the ruling must be made”).
44
For instance, hairs on a mask used in a bank robbery or hairs found on the
driver’s seat in a vehicular homicide prosecution in which defendant claims he was
the passenger, not the driver.
45
Nuclear DNA analysis usually can not be done unless the hair has roots.
46
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 11-2.1.2.
47
See State v. Pappas, 256 Conn. 854 (2001) (containing an elaborate discussion
of mtDNA technology).
43
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48

analysis. In State v. Pappas, a Connecticut case, the FBI agent
testifying for the prosecution stated that “although the most common
MtDNA type probably has a population frequency of 4 percent, the
database is not yet large enough to know the population frequency of
49
rare types, that is types that have not been seen in the data.” In the
case at issue he concluded that approximately 99.75% of the
Caucasian population could be excluded as the source of the crime
50
scene sample.
Despite the defense expert’s objection to the FBI validation
studies and statistics, the Connecticut court found that Daubert’s
51
criteria were satisfied. From all this it appears that Daubert’s criteria
are satisfied, as indeed the Connecticut court found. As compared to
microscopic hair analysis, mtDNA typing is a far more objective
technique for matching that has been vetted by the scientific
community, that receives the same attention as nuclear DNA with
regard to appropriate laboratory techniques (the same labs do both
types of DNA tests), and that is supported by a database that allows
for estimates of the frequency of the hair pattern in the relevant
population. There is only one problem. Unlike nuclear DNA testing
which identifies a profile that is highly likely to be unique when
matches occur at each of the 13 STR loci, mtDNA testing cannot
unequivocally achieve such singular identifications. All descendants
in the maternal line share a common mtDNA profile. In other
52
words, barring mutations which are not very common, all siblings,
cousins and distant cousins will have an identical mtDNA profile if
they are descended from the same maternal ancestor.
Suppose that in a case like State v. Butler, mtDNA testing
established that the crime scene hairs match the defendant’s hairs.
The only evidence in the case other than defendant’s familiarity with
the scene of the attack was the fact that his physical characteristics
were not inconsistent with the very general description provided by
the victims. Of course, siblings and maternal cousins may share a
family resemblance as well as a mtDNA profile, and they may reside
48
49
50
51

256 Conn. 854 (2001).
Id. at 872.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 874; see also State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508 (S.C. 1999) (death penalty

case).
52
FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING, supra note 6, at 48 (“[E]volutionary studies
have estimated that the average fixed mutation rate for the mtDNA control region is
one nucleotide difference per 300 generations, or one difference every 6,000 years.
Consequently, one would not expect to observe many examples of nucleotide
differences between maternal relatives.”).
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or visit in the same community. Therefore, in a given case, the four
per cent frequency rate that relates to the entire population pool may
be very misleading.
In the early days of nuclear DNA testing, commentators were
concerned about the ramifications of kinship because close relatives,
especially full siblings, have more genes in common than non53
relatives and may match at the loci being sampled. With the larger
number of loci now being sampled, the chance of a match occurring
at each and every locus is reduced substantially. However, nothing
can alter the reality that maternal relatives share the same mtDNA
profile.
We may therefore need to reconsider some of the
suggestions that were made in the context of nuclear DNA testing for
dealing with the possibility that a sibling of the defendant may have
54
committed the charged crime. For instance, should the prosecution
55
have the burden to account for defendant’s relatives? This could be
a much more difficult task with mtDNA testing than with nuclear
testing because of the far larger numbers that might have to be
accounted for. Can the prosecution compel maternal relatives to
provide hair to be tested? May that hair also be tested by microscopic
hair analysis, which the FBI claims can often distinguish between
56
samples from different individuals that are maternally related. Can
one put the burden on the defendant to bring possible maternal
relatives to the court’s attention, or is this an impermissible shifting
of a burden to the accused? Should mtDNA evidence be considered
insufficient in a case in which the prosecution introduces no other,
or virtually no other evidence, merely because of the possibility that a
maternal relative exists? It is, of course, entirely possible that a
53

See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 12, § 11-2.6.2[2] (“T]he probability that an
untested brother (or sister) would match at four loci—with alleles that each occur in
5% of the population—is about 0.006.”).
54
Recommendation 4.4 of the NRC II REPORT, supra note 8, at 6, provides: “If
possible contributors of the evidence sample include relatives of the suspect, DNA
profiles of those relative should be obtained.” The Report does not explain how to
determine or who determines the identity of “possible contributors” or whose
obligation it is to obtain DNA profiles.
55
See Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA As Criminal Identification
Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 303, 312-13 (1991)
(discussing a number of solutions: 1) putting burden on defendant “to make
plausible case that a relative committed the crime” but this runs counter to general
principle that burden is on state and defendant would be incapable of doing this
unless provided with funds for an investigation; 2) requiring state with cooperation
of defendant to identify relatives who belong in the suspect population and examine
their DNA, but expensive and relatives may be unwilling to cooperate; and 3) ignore
the issue if there is strong evidence against the defendant).
56
Houck & Budowle, supra note 27, at 964, 966 (stating that microscopic hair
analysis was far more accurate in making exclusions rather than inclusions).
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defendant might not know all his maternal relatives even if they live
in the same community.
Clearly this new type of forensic identification technique satisfies
57
Daubert and courts are holding accordingly. Although admissibility
is not a problem this does not dispose of the question of what the
evidence proves. MtDNA evidence has the potential to raise all the
58
issues of the blue bus hypothetical so beloved of Evidence
professors—but in a criminal context. Daubert does not supply the
answer.
IV. HANDWRITING
I certainly do not want to discuss handwriting identification at
length at a symposium run by Professors Risinger and Denbeaux at
which Professor Saks is a speaker. I do know true expertise when I
see it. But I do want to make a few points. First, their seminal paper
59
that exposed the flaws of handwriting expertise predates Daubert.
Although Daubert undoubtedly heightened judges’ sensitivity to the
need to scrutinize expert testimony, and led to the current climate in
which handwriting testimony is no longer universally admitted, in
theory this result could have been reached under Rule 702’s original
helpfulness test. Second, even if we assume that examiners cannot
make accurate matches and that there is insufficient data on the
significance of a match, the real problem is what should a court do?
The issue is complicated because the questioned handwriting
about which the expert wishes to testify is an item of real proof. Rule
901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence contains a number of provisions
that arguably may apply. Rule 901(b)(9) gives as an example of
identification that conforms with the rule’s requirements, “evidence
describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing
that the process or system produces an accurate result.” This is
precisely what the handwriting expert claims he is doing—that he is
instructing the jurors on a process that produces an accurate result.
The problem is that the standard of proof that Rule 901 instructs the
57

See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469 (1945) (whether purely statistical
proof—in this case that defendant operated the only bus line in town—would be
sufficient to prove that defendant’s bus caused the plaintiff’s accident. See Daniel
Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV.
530, 538 (1989) (stating that the possibility of unwarranted convictions “suggests
raising the burden of proof for all cases. It does not support a special rule for
statistical probability cases.”).
59
D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge:
The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise”, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989).
58
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court to apply is evidence “sufficient to support a finding,” the
conditional relevancy standard that also appears in Rule 104(b). This
is a standard that is considerably lower than the Rule 104(a)
preponderance of the evidence standard assigned the gatekeeping
judge in Daubert. In addition, Rule 901(b)(3) explicitly provides that
an object may be identified through the testimony of an expert
witness who has compared the item in question with “specimens that
have been authenticated.” The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule
901(b)(3) explains that it meant to reject the common law rule which
required a judge to use a higher standard than that specified in Rule
104(b) when deciding whether to admit expert testimony with
60
respect to matching handwriting exemplars.
61
In United States v. Saelee, the court, after hearing from Professor
Saks, excluded the entire testimony of the prosecution’s forensic
document analyst who had compared hand printing on package
labels with exemplars provided by the defendant. The court
mentioned the Advisory Committee note but concluded, “Rule 702
and Rule 901 must be read together. Rule 901(b)(3) contemplates
testimony by an expert—but before an expert’s testimony can be
62
admitted, it must pass through the gates of Rule 702.”
Even if we agree that this decision is correct—that Rule 702
trumps Rule 901, although perhaps Rule 901 should say so—that still
does not solve the other Rule 901(b)(3) problem. The provision
contemplates that a writing may be authenticated through
“comparison by the trier of fact . . . with specimens which have been
authenticated.” Is the defendant better protected when jurors during
deliberation compare the uncrossed t’s or undotted i’s in the crime
scene samples and the provided specimens, as they have probably
seen done on some TV show, than if the court allows a prosecution
expert to testify who is then demolished by Professor Saks? If trained
examiners lack proficiency, it would seem that the laypersons who
serve on juries must also (and indeed some studies, but not all the
studies cited in the Saelee case, have so found). What can a court do if
the jury convicts in a case in which handwriting is central after the
court has excluded the prosecution’s expert? Suppose there is little
evidence apart from the handwriting exemplars and the questioned
document which the jurors compared? Should the court grant a
motion of acquittal or set aside a verdict on insufficiency grounds?
60
“Example (3) sets no higher standard for handwriting specimens and treats all
comparison situations alike, to be governed by Rule 104(b).”
61
162 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Alaska 2001).
62
Id. at 1107.
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Again Daubert furnishes no answers.
V. FINGERPRINTING
Looked at through the lens of Daubert, fingerprints clearly
should not be admissible and yet fingerprint matches obviously are
often accurate and corroborated by other evidence. I think it highly
unlikely that any court will issue a per se ruling that all testimony
about fingerprints must be excluded despite the undisputable fact
that remarkably little research about fingerprints has ever been
63
done.
Matching fingerprints is more complicated than sampling DNA
because we know that a limited number of patterns made up of four
nucleotide bases can be sequenced at each of the loci used in DNA
testing. With fingerprints, there seem to be an endless number of
possible permutations consisting of loops, whorls, arches and deltas.
It may well be possible to identify an individual by comparing
complete sets of prints because the abundance of detail probably
makes each individual’s fingerprint pattern unique, though this has
64
never been scientifically verified. The forensic issue, however, is
whether partial, latent, blurred, and perhaps contaminated
fingerprints found at a crime scene can be matched with fingerprints
obtained from the accused. And if there were a match, what would
such a match prove? Obviously we need research to determine how
much of a print fragment, and of what quality, is needed in order for
an expert to reach a reliable conclusion about the degree of
probability that this is the defendant’s print. The fact that fingerprint
examiners do well on easy and nonchallenging proficiency tests does
not answer this question.
Hopefully, research into the validity of fingerprint matches will
be adequately funded and will commence in the near future. But
what should be done now? Generic attacks seeking to exclude all
fingerprint evidence are bound to fail. Defense counsel who are
challenging fingerprint evidence might do better relying less on
arguments about how fingerprint evidence is produced, and more on
what the evidence proves in their specific case. Instead of trying to
show that the lack of research violates Daubert, it might be more
fruitful to litigate the admissibility of fingerprint evidence with regard
to a particular blurred, small print fragment found at a crime scene.
A court that will not reject all fingerprint evidence might still find
63

See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 12, ch. 2.
In United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002), the court
took judicial notice of the uniqueness of fingerprints.
64
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that a particular match is unwarranted, as has happened in some
handwriting cases. Should the court then permit the jurors to
compare photographs of the defendant’s fingerprint with
photographs of the fingerprint lifted from the crime scene?
CONCLUSION
In criminal cases, unlike civil cases, courts have generally been
unwilling to exclude expert proof on the ground that it has not been
sufficiently validated. When the evidence is admitted it is then
labeled “reliable” because, according to Daubert, expert testimony
must be reliable in order to be deemed admissible. That should not,
however, mean that no further analysis of the evidence is required.
Admissibility and sufficiency determinations rest on more than
satisfaction of a reliability component; they require careful attention
to what the evidence proves and how the trier of fact will use it.
Each of the identification techniques discussed above raises
different issues in this respect even though the underlying inference
in each instance is the same—that a match makes it more probable
that the accused is the perpetrator. Even nuclear DNA testing—the
gold standard for expert proof—may, under some circumstances,
produce results that are completely wrong. MtDNA testing easily
meets Daubert standards but may be extremely misleading.
Handwriting, microscopic hair analysis, and fingerprinting all suffer
from serious flaws, but are not amenable to the simple solution of
excluding all such expertise. Daubert is not sensitive to these nuances.
Furthermore, because an assumption of reliability now accompanies
expert proof that is admitted, judges may overestimate the evidence’s
probative value, thereby making it more difficult for a defendant to
succeed on Rule 403 grounds or on an insufficiency motion.
What criminal defendants need in order to deal more effectively
with the forensic identification expertise proffered against them is
not more Daubert, but tools that would enable them to make more
cogent evidentiary arguments—better counsel, access to expert
assistance and more discovery.

